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The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching fund scheme that seeks to direct the 
money sent by hometown associations abroad (collective remittances) to productive uses. 
The federal, state and municipal governments contribute to the program multiplying by 
three the contributions sent by migrants abroad. Using municipal level data on program 
participation for the period 2002-2006, we evaluate the program’s capacity to target the 
poorest municipalities. Since migration has a nonlinear relationship with poverty and 
marginality, a program that unconditionally responds to project initiatives from migrant 
organizations is bound to be regressive due to self-selection bias. Indeed, poorer 
municipalities are less likely to participate and they also receive lower amounts and fewer 
projects than relatively richer localities. Moreover, we find evidence of a partisan bias: 
states and municipalities ruled by the PAN are significantly more likely to participate in the 
program, and electoral support for the PAN is associated with more funds or projects 
awarded. We argue that substantial changes should be implemented for the program to be a 
truly progressive poverty reduction tool. 
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Remittance sending is a crucial aspect of the migratory phenomenon. In a large number of 
countries, they are a substantial proportion of countries’ wealth and are located among the 
most important sources of countries’ foreign exchange. For instance, in Mexico, 
remittances are the second source of revenues after oil exports. They surpass the revenues 
from tourism and foreign direct investment. Whereas Mexico is the third largest remittance 
recipient in the world in absolute flows (behind India and China) remittances only amount 
to some 2.5% of GDP. On the contrary, in other countries, remittances are just a vital 
source of income: they amount to 27% of Moldova GDP, 16% of El Salvador GDP and 
13% of Philippines wealth. The top 19 remittance world recipients receive more than 10% 
of their GDP in remittances (World Bank 2006).  
 Given the enormous importance of these capital flows and their potential to 
contribute to development, governments of sending and receiving countries and 
international organizations are designing public policies to encourage remittance sending. 
States are also encouraging the so-called productive use of remittances, so that remittances 
are not only devoted to current consumption but are also directed to the improvement of 
living conditions in sending countries. As opposed to individual remittances, whose private 
character makes them difficult to monitor and influence, collective remittances are in 
principle apt to be used as a tool to improve the provision of social and productive 
infrastructure in backward communities.   
 The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants is one such policy. Indeed, it is taken to be 
an international reference in the area of collaborative development between diasporas 
abroad and their communities of origin (World Bank 2006; De Castro, García and Vila 
2006). The municipal, state and federal governments enter into the picture by tripling the 
amount of money sent by hometown associations (HTAs) to finance local development 
projects (electrification, water, road paving and maintenance, housing infrastructure, 
educational and health projects, and town beautification among others). Since 2002, the 
Program is implemented at the federal level and today it involves 27 Mexican states and 
over 1,000 hometown associations abroad. In these years, it has financed more than 6,000 
projects with an average annual federal investment of 15 million US$ (García Zamora 
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2007). In 2007, its federal budget was about 22 million US$ and it is expected to increase 
in 2008. 
 We evaluate municipal participation in the 3x1 Program for Migrants and try to 
assess whether program participation is progressive or not, that is, whether the program is 
able to target relatively poor municipalities and/or devote more resources or projects to 
those localities.  Given the current design of the program, which gives migrants the 
initiative in proposing the projects, we argue that the program tends to favor municipalities 
with high migration and long standing migration tradition, in which migrant associations 
are both numerous and well organized. However, since poverty imposes an important 
constraint on the ability to migrate and to send collective remittances (Hatton and 
Williamson 2002), the municipalities that are most likely to benefit from the program need 
not be among the poorest ones.  
 Also, we explore the political economy of the program, specifically, if there is any 
partisan use of it. The involvement of the three levels of government (municipal, state and 
federal) plus the migrants raises coordination and red tape problems. Also, the program 
design pose obvious concerns about the collusion or opposition among the different 
administrations: does having a common party label at the three levels of government 
increase the likelihood to be selected into the program, regardless of the degree of poverty? 
 Using a unique dataset on municipal participation in the 3x1 Program for Migrants 
during the 2002 to 2006 period, we study three different measures of program participation:  
whether any projects were funded in the municipality in a given year, the monetary amount 
awarded from all projects, and the number of projects funded in the municipality. We find 
that, after controlling for state and municipal characteristics, high migration municipalities 
are more likely to participate but the program is progressive only up to a point. Indeed, 
poorer municipalities are less likely to benefit. Besides, whereas high migration 
municipalities receive larger amounts and more projects, increased poverty levels are 
negatively correlated with the monetary amounts and the number of projects awarded to a 
municipality. We find that very poor municipalities receive lower amounts and fewer 
projects than wealthier localities with similar levels of migration. This result is robust to 
different estimation methods and to different operationalizations of our dependent and 
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independent variables. All in all, we find evidence that the program design has regressive 
consequences at the municipal level. 
Concerning the political economy of the program, our empirical analysis reveals 
that municipalities and states ruled by the conservative Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) 
were more likely to participate in the Program than their PRI (Partido de la Revolución 
Institucional) and PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) counterparts. Municipalities 
with larger PAN electoral support were also more likely to participate and to receive more 
projects. This result holds after controlling for migration and poverty levels. To make sense 
of this finding, it is important to keep in mind that this Program was launched as a federal 
policy as an initiative of the PAN under the administration of Vicente Fox (2000-2006), 
building upon the alleged success of similar programs in some high migration states such as 
Zacatecas. Also, PAN held power at the federal level for the entire sample period of our 
study. Moreover, the PAN receives relatively more political support in precisely high 
migration and low poverty municipalities. Thus, we posit that the regressive consequences 
of the Program due to the relationship between migration and poverty, may have been 
reinforced by a political or partisan bias. 
 All together, these results seriously question the design of this public policy, as it 
stands now, in its ability to improve the conditions of the poorest localities. There is also a 
real concern that the program may largely benefit those states where migrants are better 
organized, to the disadvantage of poor communities of recent but intense migration, and 
with lower organizational skills. Thus, before engaging in the international promotion of 
this sort of programs –and El Salvador, Somalia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru have already 
adopted it with variants (García Zamora 2007) – a sober reflection is needed about the 
consequences of policy intervention in the management and allocation of collective 
remittances.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of the 
policy debate about remittances, their impact on development, and common practices on 
remittance management. In section 3, we explain the precedents of the 3x1 Program for 
Migrants, we describe its current format, and hypothesize about the expected relationship 
between poverty and program participation. In section 4 we present the data and our 
empirical methodology.  Section 5 discusses our main empirical findings and its policy 
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implications. Finally, since this research cast doubts on the alleged promise of the program 
to reduce poverty, in our concluding section we propose some amendments and reflect on 
government intervention in the management of collective remittances. 
 
2. Remittances, Development, and Public Policy 
Parallel to the surge of international migration, international remittances have become a 
crucial capital flow. According to World Bank estimates, remittances amounted to 58 US$ 
billions in 1995. In 2004, the figure had increased to 160 US$ billions, surpassing by far the 
international flows of Official Development Assistance (79 US$ billions), and Private Debt 
and Portfolio Equity (136 US$ billions). By 2004, remittance flows were as large as 
Foreign Direct Investment flows (160 US$ billions) (World Bank 2006). Moreover, 
according to World Bank estimates, 50% of remittance flows remain unrecorded due to the 
use of informal channels for transferring currency. In other words, the official remittance 
figures may seriously underestimate their actual magnitude.1 
Increased awareness and improved accounting methods of these flows have driven 
the attention of researchers and policymakers to the multiple effects that remittances may 
have on migrants’ countries of origin. In turn, both host and home countries have put in 
place a panoply of public policies with two main objectives: to encourage the use of formal 
channels for remittance sending (bank-to-bank transfers, electronic transfers, personal 
checks, etc.) and to promote the so-called “productive” use of remittances back home 
(using remittances to finance projects with an eye on employment creation and growth). 
Notably, these interventions cast doubt on views of remittances as capital flows free from 
“governmental middleman.”  On the contrary, state intervention in the management of 
remittances is pervasive (Spector and de Graauw 2006) and it is expected to increase.  
Most research on the impact of remittances in sending countries is based on country, 
regional, or community level studies from which it is hard to derive general insights. 
However, some patterns seem to emerge. At the macroeconomic level, scholars have 
analyzed the impact of remittances on economic development. At the micro-level, a surge 
of studies based on household surveys have explored the effect of remittance income on 
household consumption and/or saving decisions. These studies have explored the effect of 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, between 30 and 45 percent of remittance flows come from South-South migration. China, 
Malaysia, and the Russian federation are among the top 20 sources of remittances (World Bank 2006). 
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remittances on poverty and inequality reduction as well as spending in education and 
health.2   
At the macroeconomic level, research points at the stable character of remittances 
and to their seemingly countercyclical function: remittances have a clear insurance effect in 
the face of economic crises or natural disasters. For instance, remittances as a share of 
personal consumption rose in response to the financial crisis in Mexico in 1995 as well as 
in Indonesia and Thailand during their financial crises of the late 1990s. To the extent that 
remittances smooth personal consumption by responding positively to adverse shocks, they 
may help to counter economic recessions. Also, remittances may have a positive aggregate 
impact on economic growth if they ease the credit constraints of poor households. This, in 
turn, may encourage remittance-recipient households to undertake productive investments 
with potentially positive outcomes for local employment and growth (World Bank 2006; 
OECD 2007).3  
On the negative side, scholars have surveyed to what extent large remittance flows 
resemble natural resource windfalls and other cyclical flows. “Dutch disease” effects 
caused by remittances (that is, the appreciation of the real exchange rate following large 
and sustained inflows of foreign exchange) may be of concern in countries with sensitive 
tradable sectors. Under this scenario, the export sector may suffer as a result of sustained 
remittance inflows (Fajnzylber and López 2007). Another potential negative outcome of 
remittances may have to do with labor and leisure choices in recipient households: once 
they receive remittances, people may reduce their working hours, reducing labor supply, 
which in turn results in an aggregate economic slowdown (OECD 2007). 
At the microeconomic level there is an extensive yet inconclusive research that 
explores the impact of remittances on poverty and inequality, as well as on households’ 
decisions to consume or to invest in education or health. According to the World Bank 
(2006) remittances seem to have a positive impact on poverty reduction yet a very modest 
effect on income inequality. Remittances are believed to have reduced the poverty 
headcount ratio in countries like Uganda, Bangladesh or Ghana. Research on Mexico shows 
                                                 
2 The World Bank 2006 Report “Global Economic Prospects. Economic Implications of Remittances and 
Migration” presents a comprehensive review of the economic aspects of international migration. 
3 However, these decisions are endogenous to the initial investment conditions in recipient countries: 
remittances will be more likely to translate into productive projects in those communities and localities with a 
relatively trustworthy financial sector. 
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that in Guerrero and Oaxaca, remittances lowered the share of population living in poverty 
by 2 percentage points. Also, Mexican children in households with migrants completed 
more years of schooling (Hanson and Woodruff 2003). Remittances are associated with 
lower infant mortality and higher birth weights of children left behind (Hildebrandt and 
McKenzie 2005). Yet, less optimistic views report that these decisions are restricted to the 
households located in the middle and upper middle segments of the income distribution, 
thus perpetuating if not increasing income inequality (Fajnzylber and López 2007). Also, a 
very high percentage of remittances are devoted to current consumption. This is the obvious 
consequence of remittances being the main source of income in a large share of remittance-
recipient households. According to the Inter-American Development Bank (2004), the 
share of remittances spent on household consumption is 78% in Mexico and Central 
America, while spending in real state and education is low.  On the other hand, Durand, 
Parrado and Massey (1996) contend that increased consumption does have a multiplier 
effect on aggregate demand and growth.  
It is clear that governments have plenty of reasons to try to influence both the 
amount of remittances that are sent back home and their uses. On the negative side, 
remittances may affect economic growth if they damage the export sector via exchange rate 
appreciation and/or if remittances change the propensity to work. On the positive side, 
remittances at least help to alleviate the living conditions of families with members 
abroad.4  And at best, remittances may be successfully channeled to enhance the 
development of communities of origin –the so called meso level (OECD 2007).   
                                                
Spector and de Graauw (2006) provide a description of public policy interventions 
during the so-called life cycle of remittances (before, during, and after remittance sending). 
Obviously, migration regulations have an impact on the amount of remittances sent back 
home. Thus, policies that facilitate the emigration, legal recognition, and job placement 
abroad increase remittance flows (Spector and de Graauw 2006). Policymakers have 
intervened to regulate transfer services and to encourage the use of formal remittance 
channels, particularly the official banking sector. Other policies directed at preserving the 
political and social attachments of migrants abroad (such as providing voting rights, dual 
 
4 It should be noted that there is an important normative debate regarding  the legitimacy of states to intervene 
in the handling of remittances: the way in which these private capital flows  are ultimately employed is indeed 
a prerogative of the recipient families. 
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citizenship, and providing cultural and educational programs) aim at keeping migrants’ 
loyalties alive in the event of family reunification and the permanent settlement of migrants 
in receiving countries.  
Finally, once remittances are in the sending countries, governments have offered 
incentives to save and to invest, mostly via tax breaks. Governments have also encouraged 
the participation of migrants in the development of community projects. In particular, 
sending states around the world have courted organizations of migrants abroad, 
encouraging their organization and activism building upon their spontaneous initiatives to 
finance community projects and to engage in philanthropic activities. Overall, these public 
interventions in the management of collective remittances challenge the view of these 
capital flows as alien to political influence. 
Mexico has been an active country in all these fronts. Since the 1990s, consular 
activity and official programs to assist migrants abroad have multiplied. Starting in 1997, 
Mexico allowed for dual nationality. In 2006, Mexicans abroad were allowed to vote in the 
presidential election. From 2002, under the US-Mexico Partnership for Prosperity Program, 
Mexicans could use the so called matrícula consular to open bank accounts in the United 
States and transfer money, regardless of their legal migration status. Since 1999, the cost of 
remittance sending in the US-Mexico corridor has been reduced by about 60%. And state 
and federal administrations have courted the Mexican diaspora, seeking their help to 
improve the living conditions of their communities of origin (Burguess 2005; Canales 
2005; Alarcón 2006; Spector and De Grauw 2006; World Bank 2006; Fernández, García 
and Vila 2006).  
The 3x1 Program for Migrants is one such policy. Whereas the Program has been 
publicized in policy circles as an example of a transnational policy, “a careful evaluation of 
support to HTAs through matching grant schemes and other means is yet to be undertaken.” 
(World Bank 2006, 94). Indeed, numerous discussions of the program exist (Moctezuma 
2002; Goldring 2004; García, 2006, 2007; Iskander 2005, Moctezuma and Pérez 2006; 
Burguess 2005), but they are mostly based on anecdotal evidence or in case studies whose 
selection is not always theoretically justified.  Since most of these studies focus in high 
migration states or in localities with well organized migrants, they cannot offer any 
counterfactual comparison between communities that participate in the program and 
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otherwise similar ones that do not participate. Nonetheless, it is remarkable that these 
evaluations point out to a relatively poor impact of the program in community development 
per se, while placing its virtues somewhere else, such as in strengthening the linkages 
between migrants and their communities, or improving local governance and 
accountability. The studies by Burguess (2005, 2006) and De Graauw (2005) anticipate in 
different ways the hypothesis that we systematically test here: because the Program is based 
on migrants’ demands, organized migrants have an advantage in project allocation, which 
does not necessarily coincide with the program’s stated objective of reaching the poorest 
areas. Indeed, as our evidence indicates, it does not.  
 
3. Mexican migration, poverty, and the 3x1 Program for Migrants 
As a Mexican scholar reports, the international migration of Mexicans to the US at the start 
of the 21st century can be summarized by three factors: a common border of more than 
3,000 Km, a long-lasting tradition of more than 100 years, and a diversity of origins in 
Mexico and of destinations in the US (Durand 2003). Today, 96.2% of Mexican 
municipalities register international migration. Approximately 450,000 mostly young and 
male Mexicans migrate each year.5 Over 1 million Mexican households benefit from 
remittance flows. For 40% of them, remittances represent their only income (García 
Zamora 2005; Soto and Velázquez 2006); in recent years, migration intensified, its 
destination became more permanent, and their origins became more urban and diversified 
(CONAPO 2006).    
The precedents of the 3x1 Program for Migrants are found in the state of Zacatecas, 
which is the state with the strongest and oldest migratory tradition in Mexico. The 
Federation of Zacatecans Clubs, which comprises over 70 HTAs located in Southern 
California, started to raise funds to help expatriates abroad (mostly in the event of illness or 
death) and to fund social and recreational projects back home already in the early 1960s.  
Building upon these initiatives, in 1986 the 1x1 Program was born under the 
auspices of PRI governor Genaro Borrego. In its initial design, the program contemplated 
only the state support to double the amount of money sent by migrants associations. 
Although just 28 projects were carried out under the program between 1986 and 1992, the 
                                                 
5 Between 2000 and 2003, the Mexican population residing in the US grew by 14% and it represents 30% of 
total US immigration today. 
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initiative encouraged the Federation of Zacatecan Clubs to undertake more and more 
philanthropic activities. Parallel to Carlos Salinas’ (1988-1994) interest in courting 
migration, the Zacatecan initiative received further support under Borrego’s successor, 
Arturo Romo, to create the program of International Solidarity among Mexicans, also 
known as the 2x1 Program. Under this scheme, not only the state but also the federation 
matched the contributions of HTAs. Despite a temporary backlash in the support of the 
program under Ernesto Zedillo’s term (1994-2000), the program continued to operate 
without the support of the federation but instead with the support of the municipalities. 
Under PRD governor Ricardo Monreal, the program gathered momentum, in part as 
recognition of the crucial support of migrants to Monreal’s platform. By 2002, in the state 
of Zacatecas, a total of 868 projects had been funded and 464 million pesos had been 
invested (Burguess 2005). In the meantime, the initiative had been replicated by the state 
governments of Jalisco, Durango and Guanajuato.  
Under Carlos Salinas’ term, the initiatives to encourage the formation of HTAs 
abroad multiplied. In 1989, Salinas created the Paisano Program. In 1990, he launched the 
Program for Mexican Communities Abroad, which was based in the Foreign Ministry and 
operated through a network of Mexican consulates, institutes and cultural centers. The 
Program for Mexican Communities Abroad promoted in turn the formation of State Offices 
for Mexicans Abroad. Among other things, these offices promoted the formation of HTAs 
and publicized schemes of collaborative partnership among HTAs and their communities of 
origin. It is not coincidental that during this period, the number of migrant clubs abroad 
surged (Orozco 2003; Orozco and Welle 2004). Between 1995 and 2002, the total number 
of registered clubs grew from 263 to 580 and they federated at an increasing pace 
(Burguess 2005). Alarcón reports that there are 2,000 Mexican HTAs in the US of which 
some 700 are formally registered (in Spector and de Graauw 2006). 
When Vicente Fox reached power in 2000, he renewed his commitment to work 
with HTAs and restored the federal support to collaborative programs that Ernesto Zedillo 
had suppressed. Fox created the Instituto para los Mexicanos en el Exterior and resurrected 
the matching grant program with federal support. The 3x1 Program–Citizen Initiative 
started in 2002, and later on became the 3x1 Program for Migrants.  
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The purpose of the Program is to increase the coverage and the quality of basic 
social infrastructure in localities with a high proportion of population living in poverty, 
social backwardness or high migration, following the investment initiatives of migrants 
living abroad (Soto and Velázquez 2006). This is not the only objective of the Program. It 
also aims to strengthen the links between migrants and its communities through 
collaborative development projects and the organization of migrants abroad (Ministry of 
Social Development).  
In its current design, the 3x1 Program for Migrants is administered by the Mexican 
Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL) following the initiatives of hometown 
associations. A Committee of Validation and Attention to Migrants (COVAM), which 
includes representatives of the four parties involved (migrants, municipal, state, and federal 
government via SEDESOL), prioritizes and decides on the technical viability of the projects. 
Each of these parties contributes 25% of the total cost of the approved project. Different 
participation shares from different government levels is possible: for instance, the 
federation can cover up to 50% of the project if its social impact justifies it.6  However, this 
is rarely observed in practice. Since the maximum federal participation is about 72,000 
US$, the total cost of projects funded can be as high as 290,000 US$. 
According to our data, all Mexican states except Baja California Sur, Coahuila, 
Quintana Roo, and Tabasco have already participated in this initiative. However, the 
percentage of municipalities benefiting from the program has ranged from just 10 percent 
in 2002 (239 municipalities out of 2,435) up to 18 percent in 2005 (446 municipalities out 
of 2,438).        
 We evaluate the program from the perspective of its ability to target communities 
living in poverty and social backwardness as opposed to reaching only communities of high 
migration. Given that the program design gives the initiative to HTAs, it certainly prioritizes 
the areas of highest migration tradition. However, the program objective of targeting the 
poorest communities will only be achieved as long as the areas of highest migration are 
also among the poorest ones. As it turns out, this is not the case. For instance, in 2007, 68% 
of the federal money was invested in municipalities of low and medium poverty and only 
24% was invested in poor and very poor municipalities (Aparicio et. al 2007). Moreover, 
                                                 
6 www.sedesol.mx 
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70% of all migrants’ clubs are affiliated with the states of Guerrero (PRD), Guanajuato 
(PAN), Jalisco (PAN) and Zacatecas (PRD) (Zárate 2005). Not surprisingly, in 2007, 
Zacatecas, Jalisco and Michoacán (PRD) concentrated 59% of the projects and 54% of the 
total federal resources allocated to the Program (Aparicio et. al 2007). 
 To the extent that matching grant programs respond to the income distribution of the 
actors involved, it is expected that wealthier communities will be more likely to participate 
than poorer ones.  Therefore, a program that unconditionally supports migrant and 
hometown associations’ initiatives will not be progressive if poverty and migration are not 
directly correlated.  If this is the case, the program will be biased against poor communities. 
On the other hand, to the extent that hometown associations require time to emerge and a 
certain level of organizational skills, they will be more likely to succeed in relatively well 
off communities. Based on this reasoning, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1 – self selection bias: Given that migrants self-select into the 3x1 program, and 
that Mexican migration is not evenly distributed relative to poverty, the program 
disproportionably benefits relatively well off municipalities to the detriment of poor 
ones.  
  
Systematic research on the politics of collective remittance management is practically non 
existent. There is incipient research on the political consequences of remittances at the local 
level, but they refer to private, not collective, remittances. For instance, Puftze (2007) 
reports that the additional income from remittances may weaken the power of clientelistic 
arrangements and vote buying at the local level. The author reports a greater likelihood of 
opposition winning in Mexican municipalities were a high proportion of households receive 
remittances.  However, anecdotal case studies suggest that particularistic uses may not have 
been rare. This seems to be especially true in municipal politics, where migrants’ money 
can alleviate the meager finances of the local government (Valenzuela 2006). Thus, 
migrants have been actively courted by municipal and state politicians, and they had been 
granted representation in local politics in return (Jiménez 2008).  
Some examples may illustrate the particularistic use of the program. In their study 
of the 3x1 Program in Jalisco, Hernández and Contreras (2006) report that local politicians 
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have used it to increase their popularity and try to buy votes. In her study of the 
municipality of Jala, in the state of Nayarit, Imaz (2003, 396) asserts that “migrants always 
took position and in each election they were requested to give their monetary support and 
exert their influence in favor of a particular candidate…They [migrants] were actively 
sought because they could mobilize people.” In turn, migrants declared that local politicians 
“los politiquean” (Imaz 2003, 400). As mentioned above, in her account of 3x1 Program 
evolution, Iskander (2005) explains that the momentum given to the Program in Zacatecas 
after governor Monreal election –which included cabinet-level positions for migrants– was 
part of Monreal’s acknowledgment to HTAs in return for the support given to his 
candidacy. All this suggests that remittances have empowered migrants as strategic 
municipal political allies. Indeed, knowing the resources they possess, migrants have been 
able to shape the rules of the Program to secure their monopoly: Burguess reports that in 
Zacatecas, migrants pressed to have the rules changed so that only migrants belonging to a 
registered HTA –as opposed to any interested group or individual– could finance projects 
under the Program.  
The combination of empowered migrants and clientelistic politics may have 
fomented the use of the Program as a rewarding tool. This casts doubts on a somewhat 
optimistic vision of migrants clubs and international migration in general as an engine of 
democratic change in their communities, via the import of practices and values to which 
they are exposed while abroad. In her study, Imaz concludes that (p. 416) “it is hard to 
distinguish in theory when these groups support democratic processes and when they do 
not.” In a similar vein, Bravo (2007) finds that out-migration seems to depress political 
engagement in Mexico, and that individuals who receive remittances or expect to migrate 
are significantly less likely to turn to vote than those who do not.7  
 For now, we lack the necessary information to systematically test to what extent the 
program is being used as a rewarding political tool, or whether it is empowering migrants in 
local politics. Still, we are able to explore the politics of the program by testing for different 
sorts of political or partisan bias in fund allocation. On the one hand, a federal PAN 
administration ruled over the entire sample period we survey. Thus, SEDESOL, the federal 
                                                 
7 In the same vein, Spencer and Cooper (2006) alert that HTAs may create barriers for broader political 
participation. 
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counterpart of the Program, could bias funds and project allocation in favor of PAN-ruled 
states or municipalities. Indeed, we argue that PAN may have electoral reasons to do so 
since its support is stronger in relatively rich municipalities with high migration. Note that 
if this is the case, the regressive outcome mentioned before would be reinforced through 
this political mechanism. On the other hand, a cursory look at the tripartite involvement of 
different levels of government provides ground to hypothesize that shared partisanship is 
likely to bias resource allocation:  states are likely to be more supportive of projects 
proposed by municipalities with a similar party label. Thus, we hypothesize that sharing 
partisanship between the municipal and state governments will increase the chances of 
program participation. Therefore, we expect that: 
 
H2 – partisan bias: All else equal, states and municipalities ruled by the PAN as 
well as PAN strongholds, are more likely to participate, receive more funds and 
projects, than those dominated by other political parties. Moreover, shared 
partisanship between municipal and the state governments increases the likelihood 
of successful program participation. 
 
4. Data and empirical methods 
To test our hypotheses, we collected data from the 3x1 Program for Migrants for all 
Mexican municipalities that participated during the 2002 to 2006 period (SEDESOL). The 
dataset includes yearly information on whether or not a given municipality participated in 
the program, the total amount invested, and the number of projects awarded in any given 
year.  Note that we do not have information about the full pool of project applications. 
Instead, we have information only on the projects that were selected. We compiled 
municipal level data on migration intensity (CONAPO), degree of poverty or marginality, 
public goods provision, municipal finances (INEGI), and electoral returns by party 
(CIDAC).8 On average, we have data for more than 2,400 municipalities and five years of 
program operation, which amounts to over 12,000 municipality-year observations.  
                                                 
8 We have data for every single project awarded in the sample period but we consolidated the data at the 
municipal level because most demographic, economic and political covariates are only available at the 
municipal level. 
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To assess the effect of migration, poverty and political covariates on participation in 
the 3x1 Program in Mexican municipalities, we estimate a series of regression models of 
the following form: 
 
Pr(PARTICIPijt = 1 | X) = F(βMIGRATIONijt + χPOVERTYijt+ δSOCIODEMOGijt +  
φPOLITICSijt + μj  + vt)                 (1) 
 
PARTICIPijt = α + βMIGRATIONijt + χPOVERTYijt+ δSOCIODEMOGijt +  
  φPOLITICSijt + μj  + vt + εijt                  (2) 
 
where the subscripts refer to the i-th municipality in the j-th state, and t refers to a given 
year. The dependent variable, program participation, is measured in three different ways.  
First, PARTICIPATION is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a particular 
municipality in a given year had any project funded by the program. Second, the variable 
AMOUNT measures the total amount of funds (from all four sources, in 2006 constant 
pesos) invested in a particular municipality-year as a result of program participation. 
Finally, PROJECTS measures the number of projects that were awarded to a particular 
municipality in a given year. For example, in 2003, Tanhuanto, a municipality located in 
the state of Michoacán, participated in the 3x1 Program with six projects and a total 
investment of approximately 95,000 US$.   
Our main independent variables are different measures of migration intensity, 
poverty, and political conditions.9 Measures of migration and poverty were obtained from 
CONAPO and INEGI, respectively. The variable MIGRATION is an ordinal variable that 
classifies municipalities in six categories ranging from high, very high, medium, low, very 
low and no migration municipalities. This variable is a categorization of the MIGRATION 
INDEX, a continuous variable that we used in some of our statistical specifications. The 
MIGRATION INDEX is principal-components score based on census data regarding the 
number of family members that live abroad, circulatory migration, and return migration in 
the household. The measure of POVERTY is a categorical variable that classifies Mexican 
municipalities in high, very high, medium, low and very low poverty or marginality. It is 
                                                 
9 Note that we consider migration intensity as a proxy of the number of HTAs (about which we do not have 
direct information). However, the capacity for collective action of HTAs and their organizational skills are an 
important unobservable variable.  
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derived from the continuous POVERTY INDEX, which summarizes information on literacy 
rates, income levels, and social infrastructure in each municipality. For instance, according 
to our data, Tanhuanto is reported as a high migration and low poverty municipality in 
2003. 
 SOCIODEMOG is a vector of variables that control for (the log of) population size as 
well as other measures of infrastructure, such as the percentage of households in a 
municipality in which water, sewage, and electricity are available (INEGI). In Tanhuanto, 
92 percent of households had water, 81 percent sewage, and 97 percent had electricity 
coverage.  
 To test our second set of hypotheses, the POLITICS vector includes indicator 
variables that capture the party label of municipal and state governments. These variables 
were set to control for governments led by the PAN, PRI or PRD—the three main political 
parties in Mexico. In some specifications, we also consider the VOTE SHARES of each of 
these parties in municipal races, and the vote share difference between the PAN and PRI.  
Also, to measure electoral competitiveness, we use the MARGIN of victory between winner 
and runner up in municipal races. Finally, SHARED PARTISANSHIP is a dummy variable 
that equals one when the municipality and the state are ruled by the same political party, 
regardless of their party label. Finally, μj and vt represent state and year fixed effects, 
respectively, which we use in our models to capture the time invariant heterogeneity of the 
Mexican states as well as any systematic year by year changes in the size of the Program or 
its operation rules.10 
 Our estimation techniques vary according to the nature of the dependent variables.  
Thus, for the binary dependent variable, PARTICIPATION, we estimate maximum 
likelihood logistic models as indicated by equation (1).  For the AMOUNT variable, we 
estimate OLS models following equation (2).  To verify the robustness of our estimates for 
the AMOUNT variable, we estimated both a two-way fixed effects OLS model and a 
Heckman sample selection model.  The first stage or selection equation of the Heckman 
model estimates the likelihood of Program participation using a probit model, which is then 
                                                 
10 We included state instead of municipal fixed effects for several reasons: first, because we had a few time 
invariant variables, which prevented us from using municipal effects. More substantively, states also have a 
strong influence in program participation because they have to commit resources ex ante via agreements with 
SEDESOL. Moreover, since migration has been historically concentrated in certain regions, four states 
concentrate almost half of the funds and projects.    
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used in a second stage to estimate the amount awarded while controlling for the program 
selection process.  As we stressed before, program participation depends on migrants’ 
initiatives, which may create a bias in favor of municipalities of high and long lasting 
migration tradition. Thus, we use the MIGRATION INDEX as the selecting variable in the 
Heckman model.  
 Since the PROJECTS dependent variable is a count measure, we estimate another 
maximum likelihood model, in this case assuming a negative binomial distribution. Our 
over dispersion tests suggested that a negative binomial was preferred to a Poisson 
distribution.  Furthermore, since only a fraction of all municipalities participate in the 
program, we estimated a zero inflated negative binomial model (ZINB) for the number of 
projects that a particular municipality was awarded in a given year.11  As done in the 
Heckman models, we used the MIGRATION INDEX to predict the cases with no projects 
awarded at all.  
Figure 1 below presents two box plots that illustrate the relationship between 
migration and poverty. We measure migration using CONAPO’s index of migration 
intensity (left panel) and the percentage of households that receive remittances (right 
panel). As the figure reveals, migration is greater in medium and low marginality 
municipalities. The richest and poorest municipalities have the lowest migration intensity. 
In fact, the lowest migration intensity is found in very high poverty municipalities. 
Similarly, the highest percentage of remittance recipient households is located in 
municipalities of low and medium poverty. And again, the poorest municipalities have the 
lowest percentage of remittance recipient households. Taken together, these descriptive 
data point out a nonlinear relationship between migration and poverty: very affluent and 
very poor municipalities have the lowest migration intensity and the lowest percentage of 
remittance recipient households. Given this curvilinear relationship, we include the 
POVERTY INDEX and the square of it in our specifications.  
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
 
                                                 
11 The number of projects awarded had a clear inflation of zeros because only a few municipalities participate 
in the Program. A Voung test to decide between a standard negative binomial and a zero inflated negative 
binomial favored the latter. 
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Recall that the initiative to participate in the 3x1 Program correspond to migrants’ 
HTAs. But HTAs take time to emerge and acquire the necessary organizational skills. As a 
result, HTAs are likely to concentrate in areas not only of high migration but also of long 
standing migration tradition. Given this premise, it is not surprising to find preliminary 
evidence suggesting that high migration municipalities, that is, municipalities relatively 
affluent, have been the ones most often benefited by the program.  
Figure 2 below illustrates these relationships. The box plot graphs the number of 
projects and the total amount of resources devoted by the program to municipalities of 
different poverty levels during the 2002 to 2006 period. As expected, low and medium 
poverty municipalities were awarded more projects and larger funding. By granting migrant 
organizations the initiative to self select projects, the program design seems to produce a 
perverse outcome: since organized migrants do not come from the poorest Mexican 
municipalities, the program is biased against poor and very poor communities despite its 
stated objective to target poor communities.  
 
*** Figure 2 about here *** 
 
If the program favors relatively well off municipalities to the detriment of poor 
ones, can this bias be partly motivated by partisan or political reasons? Figure 3 depicts 
municipal election returns for different migration and poverty categories. It suggests that 
the PAN may have good reasons to actively support the program, for the PAN is stronger in 
low poverty (more affluent) municipalities with high migration. Whereas the PRI leads in 
high poverty municipalities regardless of their migration level, the PAN support increases 
with migration intensity in municipalities with medium to very low marginality. Thus, a 
political bias may in fact reinforce the self selection bias that we have hypothesized, 
yielding a more regressive outcome: if the program has a bias in favor of the PAN, it will 
not only benefit high migration municipalities but also favor the relatively richer ones. 
 
*** Figure 3 about here *** 
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Figures 1 and 2 lend support to our first hypothesis regarding the self-selection bias 
of the 3x1 Program.  And Figure 3 above is suggestive of a potential partisan bias in the 
selection of municipalities that participate in the program to the advantage of municipalities 
where the PAN electoral support is stronger. However, these figures only indicate pair wise 
unconditional relationships, that is to say, they do not control for other factors that may 
determine successful participation in the 3x1 program.  To verify which ones of our 
hypothesized biases is supported by evidence in a more controlled setting, we now turn to 
multiple regression analysis. 
 
5. Results 
To estimate the conditional effect of migration, poverty and political covariates on 
participation in the 3x1 Program in Mexican municipalities, we estimate equations (1) and 
(2) with a series of multiple regression models using a panel dataset that comprises data 
from more than 2,400 municipalities over the 2002 to 2006 period.  TABLE 1 presents 
descriptive statistics of our data for all municipalities in the sample period, and for the 
subset of municipalities that participate in the program.  About 13 percent of municipalities 
have participated in the program, with an average investment of 170,000 US$ on 3.4 
projects.  As the table indicates, the poverty levels of participating municipalities are below 
the full sample average, and their migration intensity is well above average.  Water, sewage 
and electricity coverage is also higher than average in participating municipalities. Relative 
to overall sample averages, states and municipalities ruled under PAN and PRD are 
overrepresented in the participating sample, whereas the PRI is underrepresented.  Shared 
partisanship between local and state governments is also higher than average, while 
electoral competitiveness is slightly lower.   
 
*** Table 1 about here*** 
 
To test whether these differences remain significant when holding other factors 
constant, we estimate a set of multiple regressions. TABLE 2 summarizes the results from 
six different model specifications for our three measures of program participation: whether 
the municipality participated in the program or not, the total amount received, and the 
number of projects awarded to a municipality in a given year. Our main independent 
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variables are migration and poverty levels, controlling for other socio-demographic 
characteristics of municipalities. 
 Model 1 in TABLE 2 presents a baseline logit estimation of program participation, 
coded as a binary outcome. Controlling for state and year effects, the model indicates that 
the likelihood of program participation significantly increases with migration intensity. On 
the other hand, high and very high poverty municipalities are also more likely to participate 
than localities with low or very low poverty levels. Program participation also increases 
with (the log of) population size, a variable that is strongly correlated with municipal 
income—a result that will prove to be robust in all other models.  Also, water and sewage 
coverage positively affect participation.   
 In principle, the finding that program participation is increasing with poverty levels 
seems to run against our hypothesis concerning the regressive character of the 3x1 
Program. But focusing on participation as a binary outcome obscures the fact that some 
municipalities in fact receive more funds and projects than others. Thus, model 2 turns the 
attention to the total amount devoted by the program to a given municipality. This model 
presents OLS estimates for program amounts with two-way state and year fixed effects. As 
expected, results indicate that municipalities with high or very high migration receive 
significantly larger amounts (between 15,000 and 25,000 US$ more) than those with lower 
migration. However, now we find that poverty levels have no statistically significant impact 
on the amounts received. In other words, the amounts awarded by the Program seem to be 
unrelated to the relative backwardness of municipalities. 
Given that migration intensity is not randomly or evenly distributed in Mexican 
municipalities, it may be the case that our previous OLS results have a sample selection 
problem: if some municipal or state features influence both program participation and the 
amounts received, OLS estimates may be biased. Moreover, since we only observe the 
amount of money awarded to participating municipalities, and zero otherwise, we need to 
correct for the incidental truncation of the amount variable. Models 3 and 4 in TABLE 2 
addresses this issue with a Heckman sample selection estimation where we use the 
migration index as the key selecting variable.12 Once we control for the selection process 
                                                 
12 We decided in favor of the continuous indexes of poverty and migration in the models that follow for two 
reasons. Some models did not converge when including too many dummy variables, and, as model 1 
indicates, migration and poverty had a positive and monotonic effect on program participation. 
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before estimating the amount regression, we find that indeed the poverty index is positively 
correlated with program selection but up to a point. Indeed, the quadratic term has a 
negative and significant sign, which is coherent with the curvilinear relationship that we 
found in the descriptive statistics and suggestive of a regressive outcome in program 
participation. In fact, the poorest 20% of municipalities is less likely to participate. 
Moreover, poverty is negatively correlated with the amounts received (significant at the 
10% level).13   
 To assess whether these results hold if we focus on the number of projects awarded 
(a count variable) instead of the amounts, models 5 and 6  in TABLE 2 present estimates 
from a zero inflated negative binomial regression (ZINB). As in our previous Heckman 
model, we use migration index and poverty (plus a quadratic term) to predict program non-
participation before estimating the count model.14  Model 5, which is the inflation equation, 
indicates that the probability of not being awarded a project decreases on migration but 
increases with poverty. In turn, the participation equation (Model 6) indicates that 
increasing poverty levels led to significantly fewer projects awarded, controlling for 
population size, coverage of public services, and year effects.  
To sum up, our regression estimates indicate that migration intensity and population 
size are very good predictors of program participation for every one of our three dependent 
variables. Poverty levels measured as an index variable are positively correlated with the 
likelihood of program participation as a binary outcome, but only up to a particular level of 
marginality after which the likelihood of program participation decreases. On the other 
hand, poverty is negatively and significantly correlated with amounts received and the 
number of projects awarded to municipalities—a result that lends support to our self-
selection hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
13 We included a quadratic term only in the selection equation. When a quadratic term was included in the 
AMOUNT equation, we found signs of a progressive outcome (U-shape) with more funds awarded to more 
backward communities. However, further exploration revealed that this result was due to 65 municipal-year 
outlier observations. 
14 In ZINB models the first stage or inflation equation estimates a logit model of non-participation and, as 
expected, the migration coefficient switches sign. This model only includes time effects because it did not 
converge when using two-way fixed effects. ZINB estimations can be very sensitive to the specification of the 
inflation equation (the equation that predicts non participation). For this reason, we run a standard Negative 
Binomial as robustness check. The substantive results hold: the number of projects increases with migration 
and it is regressive with respect to poverty. We thank Brian Burgoon for this comment. 
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***Table 2 about here*** 
 
To test our political bias hypotheses, TABLE 3 adds a number of political covariates to the 
previous Heckman and ZINB regression models. In Model 1, we included dummy variables 
that indicate whether the PAN or PRI control the state and municipal government, using 
PRD governments as the comparison category. Results indicate that, after controlling for 
migration, poverty, and other covariates, PAN states and municipalities were significantly 
more likely to participate in the program. Once selected among the participating 
municipalities, however, PAN governments are not awarded any more resources than their 
PRI or PRD counterparts (Model 2).   
To test whether the program favors any partisan strongholds, Models 3 and 4 
include both PAN and PRI municipal vote shares. We find evidence suggesting that 
municipalities with stronger PAN support were more likely to participate in the program 
than others. In contrast, Model 4 indicates that PAN electoral support does not impact 
amounts any more than that of the PRD, whereas PRI support is negatively correlated with 
amounts awarded. This result means that, all else equal, there are larger amounts awarded 
in PAN or PRD strongholds, to the detriment of PRI core localities. Moreover, Models 5 and 
6 indicate that municipalities in which PAN electoral support is particularly high relative to 
the PRI are more likely to be selected into the program and to receive more resources. 
Besides partisan biases and migrant self-selection, it may also be the case that the 
authorities from municipalities with more contested elections seek out to participate and 
attract more program resources to improve public good provision in competed settings. 
Finally, since the program requires the collaboration of state and municipal governments, it 
may also be the case that when these two levels of government belong to the same party, 
they are more likely to coordinate and benefit from the program. Models 7 and 8 in TABLE 
3 test these hypotheses by including the margin of victory in municipal elections -- a proxy 
of electoral competitiveness -- and the shared partisanship dummy variable. As it turns out, 
none of these two variables have an impact on the participation or amount equations. These 
negative findings can be interpreted as evidence that the program is not being used to target 
competitive localities or to punish juxtaposed governments. 
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 Models 9 to 12 in TABLE 3 reproduce the previous analysis but turn attention to the 
number of projects awarded using ZINB models. The inflation equation shows as before 
that the probability of non-participation is negatively related to migration and has a J-shape 
relative to poverty (poorer municipalities are more likely not to participate). One robust 
result across all specifications is that states governed by the PRI received significantly 
fewer projects than their PAN or PRD counterparts. According to Model 10, municipalities 
with greater PAN support received more projects than other party strongholds, a result that 
is also confirmed by Model 11. Finally, Model 12 indicates that the margin of victory does 
not impact the amount of projects awarded, whereas shared partisanship between state and 
local authorities yields to more projects awarded. As before, the results concerning 
migration and poverty remain robust in these specifications: Whereas high migration 
municipalities receive more projects, poorer and less populated municipalities, where 
migrants are likely to be less well organized, are awarded fewer projects.  
 In sum, we find evidence of significant partisan effects in the implementation of the 
3x1 Program. We find that PAN states and municipalities are more likely to participate in 
the program, but with no additional amounts or projects, than those ruled by other political 
parties. Municipalities with larger PAN support are also more likely to participate than 
others. Moreover, PRI strongholds receive lower amounts than those of the PAN or PRD 
after controlling for migration intensity. Nonpartisan political factors, such as election 
closeness or juxtaposed governments do not affect any measure of program participation.  
It is important to remark that the political bias may be caused by an alternative 
mechanism that we cannot test: given that the 3x1 Program is a demand-driven policy, 
migrants may prefer to invest in PAN municipalities. Indeed, recent studies suggest that 
migrants hold anti-PRI political preferences (Bravo). If this is the case, the mechanism 
would not be one of PAN politicians biasing the selection of projects but rather one of 
migrants selecting PAN municipalities for their investments. Note that both mechanisms are 
plausible and likely to operate in tandem. Yet, regardless of which mechanism prevails, our 
regressive argument holds: because high migration PAN strongholds are relatively affluent 
(see Figure 3), the political bias reinforces the self-selection bias.15  
                                                 
15 A very interesting research agenda has explored the use of clientelistic vs. programmatic spending in 
Mexican municipalities (Cayeros et al 2007). According to this research PRI politicians used a mixed of 
private and public goods to target strongholds and competed municipalities respectively. Whereas this 
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Our results concerning migration and poverty are robust to the inclusion of political 
covariates. Whereas increased migration impacts program participation, poverty levels have 
a curvilinear, negative or non-significant impact on participation, number of projects and 
the amounts awarded. Overall, both geography and politics reinforce each other in 
producing a regressive outcome. 
 
*** Table 3 about here*** 
 
Plotting predicted probabilities of participation may help clarify the relative impact 
of migration, marginality and partisan biases on the probability of participation as well as in 
the amount of funds received. In order to do this, we rely on the Heckman selection models 
1 and 2 from TABLE 3 to estimate predicted probabilities of participation as well as the 
predicted amounts. Figure 4 shows that migration positively affects the probability of 
program participation. Moreover, PAN states and PAN municipalities are more likely to 
participate than PRI or PRD governments. Figure 5 shows that poverty has a curvilinear 
impact on the probability of program participation: rich and poor municipalities have less 
probability of participating (the figure is for PAN municipalities located in PAN states). On 
the other hand, model 2 in TABLE 3 also reveals that a one unit increase in the poverty 
index decreases the amount of money awarded by about 20,000 US$. According to the 
count models, one standard variation change in the level of poverty reduces the expected 
count of projects by 0.75 whereas a one standard deviation increase in migratory intensity 
increases the expected count of projects in 1.33. Holding all other factors constant, being in 
a PAN state increases the expected rate of projects by a factor of 1 (based on model 9, 
TABLE 3). Finally, one standard variation change in PAN vote share increases the expected 
count of projects by 1.1 (model 10, TABLE 3). 
 
 
*** Figures 4 and 5 about here *** 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
research is informative to us, the Program we explore is unlikely to fit the above political economy in that 
politicians are not entirely free to design the policy to pursue their electoral goals (it is a demand-driven 
program, thus, a HTA initiative is needed in the first place), and the clientele that the Program courts 
(migrants) has been granted voting rights only in the federal elections that took place in the last year covered 
by this study (2006). 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
Remittances have become a crucial source of revenue in many developing countries. 
Whereas some analysts (Durand, Parrado and Massey 1996) regard them as flows that can 
circumvent state intervention –which is regarded an advantage in poorly institutionalized 
and often corrupt political settings– the fact is that governments do intervene to influence 
the amount of remittances that arrive in sending countries, the channels by which they 
arrive, and their uses once at home. These interventions are likely to increase as 
governments become more and more aware of their developmental potential. Precisely due 
to this characterization of remittances as alien to political intervention, political economy 
research on remittances has been rare (for exceptions see Bravo 2007; Pfutze 2007). In this 
paper, we explore the 3x1 Program for Migrants, a well publicized public policy program 
directed at channeling collective remittances to so-called “productive uses” in migrants’ 
communities of origin. 
 We raised two main points.  First, because the program design gives the initiative to 
migrants, its capacity to target poor municipalities crucially depends on the relationship 
between poverty and migration. If municipalities of highest and longest migration tradition 
are not among the poorest ones, as it is the case in Mexico, the program will be unlikely to 
reduce poverty due to a self-selection bias. Secondly, the 3x1 Program for Migrants was 
launched at the federal level under a PAN administration led by Vicente Fox, who 
previously served as the governor of the high migration state of Guanajuato (Smith 2003). 
The involvement of three different levels of government in addition to migrant 
organizations in the allocation of projects raises concerns about partisan or political biases 
in the actual implementation of the program. 
 Indeed, we found that whereas poorer municipalities were more likely to participate 
in the program, poverty levels were either inconsequential or negatively related to the 
amount of money received and to the number of projects awarded. We also found partisan 
effects in the implementation of the 3x1 Program. PAN states and municipalities were more 
likely to participate in the program than those ruled by other political parties. Municipalities 
with larger PAN electoral support were also more likely to participate and to receive more 
projects. Moreover, the partisan bias reinforces the self-selection bias of the program 
because high-migration and relatively well-off municipalities tend to favor the PAN. All 
 25Visiting Resource Professor Papers LLILAS, The University of Texas at Austin http://www.utexas.edu/cola/insts/llilas/
Aparicio and Meseguer  Collective remittances and the state 
 
together, these results cast doubt on the ability of this kind of policies to target the 
communities where the program’s public resources are most needed. 
 Two simple amendments to the program design might help increase the chances that 
the poorest communities –where migrants are fewer in number and not very well 
organized– are not excluded from its benefits. First, only communities beyond a particular 
poverty threshold could be eligible to participate. Second, projects from medium to low 
poverty locations could receive a smaller subsidy from the state and federal governments 
than those from high poverty areas, where migrant organizations may not be able to afford 
an equal share of the project’s costs. Yet, changing the rules of the program is bound to 
raise all sorts of political resistance among relatively well-off migrants whose political 
power has been on the rise and among local politicians eager to court them. 
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FIGURE 2. Number of projects awarded and total investment of the 3x1 Program in  
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Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Municipal participation 0.134 0.341
Amount (in million constant 0.234 0.992 1.746 2.172
Number of projects 0.458 2.240 3.421 5.230
Poverty index 0.012 0.990 -0.339 0.755
Very low poverty 0.100 0.300 0.088 0.284
Low poverty 0.173 0.378 0.281 0.450
Medium poverty 0.203 0.402 0.294 0.456
High poverty 0.370 0.483 0.281 0.449
Very high poverty 0.155 0.362 0.056 0.230
Migration intensity index 0.039 0.986 0.901 1.090
No migration 0.038 0.192 0.002 0.043
Very low migration 0.353 0.478 0.080 0.271
Low migration 0.244 0.430 0.156 0.363
Medium migration 0.162 0.368 0.223 0.417
High migration 0.136 0.343 0.340 0.474
Very high migration 0.067 0.250 0.199 0.400
Water coverage 0.726 0.237 0.787 0.201
Sewage coverage 0.541 0.300 0.671 0.250
Electricity coverage 0.875 0.172 0.888 0.191
Log(population in millions) -4.503 1.489 -4.037 1.210
PAN state 0.218 0.413 0.418 0.493
PRI state 0.668 0.471 0.258 0.438
PRD state 0.196 0.397 0.348 0.477
PAN municipality 0.214 0.410 0.307 0.461
PRI municipality 0.442 0.497 0.405 0.491
PRD municipality 0.160 0.366 0.214 0.410
PAN vote share 0.225 0.187 0.271 0.174
PRI vote share 0.340 0.194 0.363 0.146
PRD vote share 0.170 0.177 0.213 0.177
PAN-PRI vote margin -0.115 0.205 -0.093 0.215
Margin of victory 0.102 0.120 0.111 0.103
Shared partisanship 0.425 0.494 0.478 0.500
Number of observations 12,169 1,629
     2435 municipalities / 31 states / 5 years.
Note: t-tests for differences in means are statistically significant at the 5% level in all cases.
TABLE 1
The 3x1 Program in Mexican Municipalities, 2002-2006
Descriptive statistics
All municipalities Participating municipalities
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit FE OLS
Migration
  Very Low 1.223 -0.034
[0.593]** [0.044]
   Low 1.931 -0.012
[0.598]*** [0.047]
  Medium 2.396 -0.006
[0.599]*** [0.049]
  High 2.976 0.246
[0.600]*** [0.051]***
  Very High 3.193 0.159
[0.604]*** [0.056]***
Poverty
  Low 0.502 0.021
[0.139]*** [0.034]
  Medium 0.542 -0.051
[0.157]*** [0.038]
  High 1.221 -0.031
[0.181]*** [0.042]
  Very High 1.433 -0.029
[0.244]*** [0.053]
Migration intensity index 0.251 -2.251 0.366
[0.020]*** [0.138]*** [0.038]***
Poverty 0.874 -0.214 -0.933 -0.396
[0.113]*** [0.124]* [0.236]*** [0.072]***
Squared Poverty -0.137 0.168
[0.021]*** [0.051]***
Water 0.623 0.049 0.242 -0.32 0.094
[0.191]*** [0.042] [0.104]** [0.303] [0.191]
Sewage 0.368 -0.015 0.241 -0.02 0.685
[0.190]* [0.043] [0.106]** [0.296] [0.170]***
Electricity -0.033 -0.082 -0.106 -0.381 -0.934
[0.195] [0.051] [0.108] [0.267] [0.211]***
Log (Population) 0.246 0.056 0.157 0.37 0.495
[0.037]*** [0.008]*** [0.020]*** [0.054]*** [0.031]***
Constant 0.482 -1.055 3.641 1.231 2.604
[0.085]*** [0.264]*** [0.665]*** [0.239]*** [0.344]***
Observations 11786 12118 12118 12118 12118 12118
No. of states / years 27 / 5 31 / 5 31 / 5 31 / 5 31 / 5 31 / 5
Program participation is a binary outcome, amount awarded is measured in million pesos in constant prices.
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
All models include state and year effects, except models 5 and 6, which only includes year effects.
TABLE 2
Participation in the 3x1 Program for Migrants in Mexican Municipalities, 2002 - 2006
Heckman selection model Zero Inflated Negative Binomial
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Migration Index 0.249 0.252 0.252 0.251 0.292 0.291 0.292 0.295
[0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.038]*** [0.038]*** [0.038]*** [0.038]***
Poverty 0.903 -0.21 0.919 -0.182 0.923 -0.185 0.875 -0.214 -0.291 -0.273 -0.276 -0.287
[0.113]*** [0.124]* [0.114]*** [0.124] [0.114]*** [0.124] [0.113]*** [0.124]* [0.072]*** [0.072]*** [0.072]*** [0.072]***
Squared Poverty -0.141 -0.144 -0.145 -0.137
[0.021]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]***
Politics
  PAN State 0.269 0.339 0.268 0.252 0.268 0.258 0.29 0.323 0.007 -0.014 0.01 0.054
[0.115]** [0.334] [0.115]** [0.333] [0.115]** [0.333] [0.115]** [0.334] [0.086] [0.087] [0.082] [0.081]
  PRI State -0.089 0.077 -0.095 0.062 -0.095 0.062 -0.105 0.068 -1.506 -1.497 -1.484 -1.495
[0.126] [0.354] [0.126] [0.353] [0.126] [0.353] [0.126] [0.354] [0.086]*** [0.085]*** [0.084]*** [0.084]***
  PAN Municipality 0.126 -0.083 0.138
[0.056]** [0.144] [0.089]
  PRI Municipality -0.072 -0.015 0.071
[0.049] [0.128] [0.075]
  PAN Municipal Vote Share 0.372 0.511 0.529
[0.131]*** [0.353] [0.201]***
  PRI Municipal Vote Share -0.291 -1.073 -0.308
[0.141]** [0.410]*** [0.198]
  PAN-PRI Municipal Vote Share 0.334 0.754 0.416
[0.096]*** [0.253]*** [0.152]***
  Municipal Competitiveness -0.112 0.608 -0.051
[0.169] [0.483] [0.295]
  Shared Partisanship 0.036 0.041 0.117
[0.038] [0.098] [0.064]*
Water 0.231 -0.312 0.221 -0.361 0.22 -0.35 0.238 -0.331 0.02 -0.005 -0.012 0.027
[0.104]** [0.303] [0.104]** [0.302] [0.104]** [0.302] [0.104]** [0.303] [0.188] [0.188] [0.188] [0.188]
Sewage 0.237 -0.014 0.248 -0.034 0.25 -0.032 0.242 -0.012 0.202 0.221 0.228 0.21
[0.106]** [0.296] [0.106]** [0.295] [0.106]** [0.295] [0.106]** [0.296] [0.173] [0.172] [0.171] [0.172]
Electricity -0.11 -0.37 -0.108 -0.39 -0.11 -0.381 -0.098 -0.372 -0.608 -0.594 -0.609 -0.588
[0.108] [0.267] [0.108] [0.266] [0.108] [0.266] [0.108] [0.267] [0.192]*** [0.192]*** [0.191]*** [0.192]***
Log (Population) 0.153 0.372 0.154 0.343 0.155 0.344 0.157 0.362 0.349 0.347 0.351 0.348
[0.020]*** [0.054]*** [0.020]*** [0.054]*** [0.020]*** [0.054]*** [0.020]*** [0.054]*** [0.030]*** [0.031]*** [0.030]*** [0.031]***
Constant -1.389 3.331 -1.393 3.557 -1.361 3.314 -1.354 3.187 2.428 2.425 2.521 2.38
[0.292]*** [0.773]*** [0.298]*** [0.799]*** [0.289]*** [0.760]*** [0.290]*** [0.768]*** [0.341]*** [0.354]*** [0.336]*** [0.346]***
Migration Index -2.234 -2.224 -2.22 -2.235
[0.155]*** [0.154]*** [0.154]*** [0.156]***
Poverty -0.933 -0.926 -0.929 -0.92
[0.252]*** [0.252]*** [0.252]*** [0.253]***
Squared Poverty 0.195 0.195 0.196 0.193
(ZINB inflation equation) [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.054]***
Observations 12,103 12,103 12,103 12,103 12,103 12,103 12,101 12,101 12,103 12,103 12,103 12,101
No. of states / years 27 / 5 31 / 5 27 / 5 31 / 5 27 / 5 31 / 5 27 / 5 31 / 5 31 / 5 31 / 5 31 / 5 31 / 5
Units are municipality/year observations. Program participation is a binary outcome, amount awarded is measured in million pesos in constant prices.
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
All Heckman models include state and year effects, ZINB models only include year effects.
Political determinants of Participation in the 3x1 Program for Migrants in Mexican Municipalities, 2002 - 2006
Heckman selection models Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Models
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Figure 4. Predicted probability of participation in the 3x1 Program in Mexican municipalities by  

























 Figure 5. Predicted probability of participation in the 3x1 Program in Mexican municipalities (PAN 
municipalities in PAN states) by degree of poverty. Estimates are based on Model 1 in Table 3, 
holding all other covariates at their mean values. 
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